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SUMMARY
In order to mitigate the risk of inadequate electricity supply during the winter period, the Belgian au-
thority has introduced a capacity mechanism in the form of a strategic reserve. The main objective of
this mechanism was to contract retired and mothballed generation capacity, complemented with demand
response, in order to ensure the availability of sufficient capacity to meet the peak demand. The goal of
the paper is to present and discuss the implementation of the mechanism, product design choices, and the
market outcome for the first three winter periods 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17 after the introduction of
the capacity mechanism.
The development of the strategic reserve is driven by concerns towards generation adequacy in the
Belgian control zone, which originated following the nuclear phase-out decision, the low profitability of
the gas-fired generating units, and the absence of investments in generation capacity.
The strategic reserve is operational during the winter period lasting from 1st November to 31st March.
A yearly recurring process is initiated which starts more than one year in advance of the winter period
with an analysis conducted by the system operator regarding the security of supply, and the additional
capacity requirements to meet the predefined reliability criteria. Within two months after the study, a
Ministerial Decree is issued that decides upon the volume to be procured. In parallel, during a stakeholder
process involving all market participants the procedure for the constitution of the strategic reserve and
the functioning rules are defined by Elia. During the tendering process, the candidates for the strategic
reserve in the following winter period are selected, based on techno-economic analysis.
The participation at the strategic reserve is allocated to two categories, namely the Strategic Gener-
ation Reserve and Strategic Demand Reserve. Generation and demand response located in the Belgian
control zone can be contracted for a period of 1 to 3 years, upon decision if the federal administration.
In the first two winter periods, 2014/15 and 2015/16, there was a strong increase of the targeted volume
from 1 200MW to 3 500MW, respectively. However, in both periods the targeted volume could not be
fully contracted due to absent offers, and final contracted volumes were 847MW respectively 1 536MW.
These capacities include respectively 96 and 358.4MW of demand response. For 2016/17, no additional
volume is targeted, and the contracted volume will be kept at 750MW.
The strategic reserve in the winter period is activated bymeans of an economic and a technical trigger.
The economic trigger is linked to insufficient supply to meet the demand in the day-ahead market. The
technical trigger is linked to the risk of structural shortage within the control zone.
The reported costs have been transferred into an additional network tariff following a public service
obligation, of respectively 0.611 e/MWh and 0.997e/MWh for every MWh consumed as from respec-
tively February 2015 and January 2016.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Capacity mechanisms are implemented as a policy instrument for ensuring an adequate level of electric-
ity generation [1]. A capacity mechanism is a mechanism to value capacity contributing to adequacy,
i.e. generating units or demand response capacity, generally leading to a revenue stream for the capacity
owners, in addition to the energy-only market [2]. While the objective is similar for all capacity mech-
anisms, different generic capacity mechanism designs exist1, of which one type of implementation is
the strategic reserve. The Belgian strategic reserve implementation follows these main characteristics
of a strategic reserve. Generally, speaking, a strategic reserve mechanism is implemented alongside an
energy-only market. It establishes an out-of-the market, i.e. back-up, generating capacity that can be
activated by the system operator if there is scarcity, i.e. insufficient capacity to meet the demand. This
contracted capacity is not allowed to operate in energy or ancillary service markets, and is only activated
upon a trigger, either economic or technical [2].
Figure 1 shows the involved market participants and their relationship in a conceptual scheme. The
authority determines in consultation with the system operator and / or the regulator on a target volume
for the strategic reserve. Afterwards, the system operator is authorized to contract this capacity from
capacity providers, e.g. generating units or demand response. The system operator is also responsible for
the certification of the contracted capacity. Once contracted, the decision on the activation of capacity
is with the system operator. The activation is intended to ensure generation adequacy during hours of
system stress. Finally, the costs for contracting and activation are allocated to the final consumers, usually
in form of a “use of system” charge.
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Figure 1: Market participant and their roles in a strategic reserve design
In what follows, Section 2 introduces the context that lead to the development of the Belgian strate-
gic reserve mechanism and outlines the yearly recurring procurement process. Section 3 describes the
product design choices with respect to the contracting and the activation of the strategic reserve. Market
results of the winter periods 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17 are discussed in Section 4 and the conclusions
of the paper are given in Section 5.
2 IMPLEMENTATION OF A STRATEGIC RESERVE IN BELGIUM
In order to avoid scarcity, i.e. insufficient capacity to meet the demand, and to avoid interruptions in the
electricity supply, the Belgian authority has decided to introduce a strategic reserve as from the winter
period 2014/15. The implementation of the Belgian strategic reserve was brought forward for the first
time by the Plan Wathelet in June 2012 [3], as a larger plan to ensure the Belgian security of supply. The
plan got accepted by the government in July 2013 and put into law in March 2014 [4] which initiated the
legal and practical implementation process.
1A detailed description on the different types of implementation can be found in the technical brochure of the Cigré Working
Group C5.17 [2]. Described types are Strategic Reserve, Ex Ante Capacity Obligation, Ex Post Capacity Obligation, Capacity
Auction, Reliability Options, Capacity Payment, and Capacity Subscription.
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2.1 PROBLEM SETTING
The reason for the implementation of a Belgian strategic reserve is driven by adequacy concerns in the
Belgian control zone. The concerns originate from multiple developments. Firstly, the concern needs to
be viewed in the light of the stepwise nuclear phase-out scheduling the closure of the first nuclear power
plants starting in 2015/16 [5]. This first step would close down 1.8GW of the generation capacity while
facing peak demand of about 12-13 GW [6]2. Additionally, unplanned outages of the nuclear units due
to technical issues have lead to concerns about the availability of the ageing units [8]. Secondly, the
increase share of injection from Renewable Energy Sources (RES) has increased the needs for flexibility
in the system over the last year. A significant increase of installed capacities based on wind power (1.9
GWp in 2014 [6]) and PV (2.9 GWp 2014 [6]), resulting in approximately 12% of generated electricity
in Belgium in 2014, is expected to lower wholesale market prices. Finally, the announced closure of
existing gas-fired power plants due to the ageing of the units, or non-profitability, decreased the available
capacity with 928 MW in 2014 [9].
Together, these developments have lead to a discussion towards generation adequacy of the Belgium
power system. Next to flexibility issues of the generation mix, the upward adequacy especially in winter
months has been of concern. A set of measurements has been proposed by the Secretary of State of
Energy3 [3]. The measures include among others the revision of the nuclear phase-out schedule, i.e. the
lifetime extension of nuclear units by 10 years (put in law in 2015 [7]), and the implementation of a
strategic reserve to keep power plants, announced to be closed, available during winter months (put in
law in 2014 [4]).
2.2 YEARLY PROCUREMENT PROCESS
The strategic reserve in Belgium is implemented by means of Art. 7 of the law on the organization of the
electricity market [4]. It imposes an annual process of procurement (Figure 2) and the responsibilities of
the actors. Although the strategic reserve is operational during the winter period, as from 1st of November
until 31st ofMarch of the following year, the strategic reserve capacity is contracted for one to three years.
The starting point is an analysis regarding the security of supply, conducted by the system operator.
The analysis determines the required volume of capacity to reach the reliability criteria which are put
forward by the law, i.e. the Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), under different scenarios and sensitiv-
ities. The scenarios include the expected closures of generating units which have to be announced by
the 31st July in the year before the actual closure (Art. 4 of [4]). The final analysis is due prior to the
15th November one year before the start of the winter period. Based on the study, and after advice on
the necessity and volume by the Federal Public Service (FPS), the Federal Minister of Energy instructs
the system operator to constitute the strategic reserve for the upcoming one to three winter periods by
Ministerial Decree. This happens within one month after the advice given by the FPS, so the latest in
mid-January. After that, the system operator determines the tendering rules via the Procedure for Consti-
tution of Strategic Reserve [10] after consulting the market actors, CREG and the Federal Public Service.
Afterwards, the procedure is initiated the latest 1 month after the Ministerial Decree.
After the tendering process, the system operator reports the received offers to the regulator CREG.
All generating units that announced closure in the previous year are obliged to submit an offer in the
tendering process. The regulator controls the received offers and gives advice whether the prices for
the related volumes submitted by the suppliers are considered reasonable. In case of a positive advice
the capacity can be contracted, otherwise prices and volumes can be imposed by Royal Decree, after a
proposal by the minister. The CREG finally approves the functioning rules [11] of the strategic reserve,
determining the operation of the strategic reserve in the electricity market.
2In June 2015, by change of law, the lifetime extension is granted to the nuclear power plants scheduled to close in 2015
and 2016. Consequently, the beginning of the nuclear phase-out was shifted to 2022. The current schedule foresees the closure
of all nuclear power plants between October 2022 and December 2025 [7].
3In Belgium, the role of Minister of Energy can be replaced by a Secretary of State. The Secretary of State of Energy acts
as the Minister of Energy but has no right to vote in the cabinet.
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Figure 2: Time line for the contracting of strategic reserve Winter 2016/17 (based on [4, 12])
3 DESIGN OF STRATEGIC RESERVE
As seen in the previous section, the implementation process is started with more than one year lead
time due to the winter period initialized by the security of supply assessment. The following section
highlights the most important aspects from the constitution procedure [10] and the functioning rules [11].
Distinction is made between the contracting before the winter period, and the possible activation during
the winter periods.
3.1 CONTRACTING OF STRATEGIC RESERVE
The contracting of the strategic reserve is split into two categories, namely the Strategic Generation
Reserve (SGR) and Strategic Demand Reserve (SDR). In the following sections highlights the most im-
portant facts for the contracting. The technical and contractual details for the contracting are documented
in the functioning rules [11]. The described characteristics follow the functioning rules and constitution
procedure for the winter period 2015/16. The selection of the bids is determined by the law [4] and based
on a techno-economic assessment taking into account the submitted bid characteristics.
3.1.1 Strategic Generation Reserve (SGR)
Candidates for being contracted as SGR are only generating units within the Belgian control zone, i.e.
cross-border capacity is not allowed to participate. All generating units announcing the closure of the
unit are obliged to submit an offer to the strategic reserve. The generating units must be able to deliver
the service during the 5 winter months and are obliged to remain out of the market for 12 months starting
1st of November. The contract duration can cover up to 3 winter periods. For the first Strategic Reserve
2014/15, contracts with duration of 12 months to 36 months were targeted. This has been adapted for
the second strategic reserve 2015/16 to either 12 months or 24 months. The generating units are invited
to submit bids for both time horizons in parallel. The minimum volume for the participation is 1MW. If
selected the SGR receives a monthly payment during the 5 winter months according to its bid price based
on the contracted capacity over the given time period [e/MW-h].
The number of activations for the winter 2015/16 is limited to 131 with a maximum activation time
of 699 hours. These numbers are based on simulations following the adequacy study by Elia. This
contracted volume adds to the 750MW already contracted SGR from the winter period 2014/15 with
contract duration of 3 years (see also Fig. 5). Additional limits for the contracted volume may apply. The
contracted volume from SGR for the winter period 2015/16 is limited at 500MW. A minimum capacity
of 300MW is contracted if sufficient offers are available. In contrast, no limitation on the contracted
SGR has been applied in the first winter period.
The bid for the SGR must include both economic and technical parameters on which the selection
process is based. The economic parameters include the reservation price (e/MW/h) and the fixed activa-
tion cost (e/Notification). Technical parameters include next to offered capacity information on the fuel
type and fuel consumption which is taken as baseline for the calculation of the activation and delivery
cost using average prices for the respective fuel. The offers can be kept confidential on request of the
offering party as the bid contains sensitive data on the cost structure.
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3.1.2 Strategic Demand Reserve (SDR)
The candidates for SDR must be located within the Belgian control zone. The candidates for SDR can
chose among four different options. The options differ in their definition of the capacity and parameters
for the activation. Two main distinctions can be made between drop to and drop by. In case of drop
to, the offered capacity is the commitment of the supplier to reduce its demand to a predefined capacity.
It is determined by a lower shedding limit representing a minimum consumption of the SDR supplier.
In case of drop by, the offered capacity represents a fixed bandwidth. The supplier reduces its demand
by a predefined capacity. The reduction is compared with the promised reference capacity. The drop
by contract also includes an unshedable margin during activation, i.e. a minimum consumption which
cannot be exceeded downwards. This is to avoid a unintended increase of consumption by the SDR
provider in order to ensure the contracted volume. Consequently, for both cases, the full capacity is not
guaranteed during activation. The level of capacity that can be offered is certified taking into account the
historical consumption profiles.
Within the two categories, each two sub products with different parameters exist. The two sub prod-
ucts exist with both a maximum length of activation and minimum time between activation of 4 hours
respectively 12 hours. Moreover, they vary in the amount of activation per winter period, namely 40
respectively 20 activations per winter period. All products are based on contract duration of 12 months.
Also the bid for the SDR must include both economic and technical parameters on which the selec-
tion process is based. The economic parameters include the reservation price (e/MW/h) and the fixed
activation cost (e/Notification). Next to that, the variable cost for activation (e/MWh) and cost for
prolongation (e/h) must be stated explicitly.
During the contracting and the techno-economic assessment of capacity from SDR, an equivalence
factor is applied to SDR. The equivalence factor is a de-rating of the capacity depending on the total
contracted volume from demand response. To do so, all offers are ordered based on the bids. For the first
300MW, an equivalence factor of 1 is applied. Afterwards, the equivalence factor is stepwise reduced for
each every additional 300MW up to 0.196. This is done to account for the limited amount of activation
per SDR unit and to ensure that enough capacity is available in case of many activation per winter periods.
3.2 ACTIVATION OF STRATEGIC RESERVE
The activation of the strategic reserve has two important characteristics. These are (i) the triggers start-
ing the activation process and (ii) the possible impact on the imbalance market price during activation.
Note that the activation of the strategic reserve is only possible during the winter periods between 1st of
November and 31st of March.
3.2.1 Detection: triggers of activation
Two different triggers for the activation of the strategic reserve are defined, namely an economic and a
technical trigger. Only these triggers can initiate the notification of the contracted capacities leading to
generation by power plants respectively the reduction of demand.
Economic trigger The economic trigger is linked to the market outcome of the Belgian day-ahead mar-
ket Belpex DAM. In case there is not sufficient supply to satisfy all demand, and the price reaches
the cap of 3 000e/MWh, the volumes of the strategic generation reserve are bid ex post in a separate
Belpex Strategic Reserve Market Segment Belpex SRM at the price cap 3 000e/MWh [13]. This
mechanism does not generate spill overs to other countries, respects the merit order, and avoids
market distortions.
Technical trigger The technical trigger is activated by the system operator Elia if it detects a sufficient
risk for a structural shortage in the Belgian control zone. This follow up is done using forecasts on
estimated consumption and generation and is conducted intra-day, after clearing of the day-ahead
market (18h00). The structural shortage is detected if the forecast demand for the Belgian control
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zone is higher than the forecast generation plus the available incremental bids (IBIDs)4 or there is
an insufficient margin to cover an unplanned outage of a nuclear unit.
3.2.2 Process of activation
The process of activation of the strategic reserve includes four consecutive steps, namely detection, no-
tification, verification and delivery. This is visualized in Figure 3. The detection step is described in the
previous section. The other steps follow a logical consequence. The timing and the associated parameters
X , Y , Z are part of the offers of the individual capacity providers. The maximum values are predeter-
mined in the function rules and are chosen that the contracted capacity have the capabilities to satisfy
the needs. The maximum time between notification and delivery, i.e. the minimum requirements for
flexibility, are 5 hours for both SGR and SDR. After the notification, the contracted capacities can start
with preparing the generation respectively the load reduction. During the verification, the final decision
on the delivery is taken. The delivery follows afterwards for a maximum duration of Z hours.
1. Detection
 Economic trigger
based on Belpex DAM
/ Belpex SRM
 Technical trigger
based on system fore-
cast
2. Notification
 Select & inform SR
for warming
 Inform the market on
the use of SR
3. Verification
 Verify the need be-
fore actual delivery
 Decide on volume of
delivery
4. Delivery
 Delivery from SR for
maximum Z hours
 Impact on the balanc-
ing prices depending on
real-time situation
Day-ahead 18h,
technical follow-up intra-day
Real-Time
minusX hours
Real-Time
minus Y hours
Real-Time
Figure 3: Four phases of activation process (based on [14])
3.2.3 Adaptation of imbalance price during delivery
The injection from strategic reserve also influences the price in the real-time market, i.e. the imbalance
tariff. If there is an activation following an economic or technical trigger, there are two possibilities of
adaptation to the price. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.
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Price corrected
based on situation
without strategic reserve
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following trigger
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A
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Figure 4: Impact of strategic reserve on Imbalance Price (based on [14])
Firstly, in order to prevent enduring situations in which market participants individually are not pro-
viding enough capacity to balance their own portfolios, adaptations to the imbalance price are introduced.
The purpose of the adaptation is to give maximal incentives for market participants to maintain their
portfolio balance in case of structural shortage, and avoid that market participants would transfer their
shortage from day-ahead to the real-time. Therefore, when the strategic reserve is activated upon one
of the triggers, an administrative price is set of 4 500e/MWh. The increase of the price signal is done
4Incremental bids (IBIDs) are free reserve capacity bids. The unused capacity after the day-ahead market is transferred to
the balancing market.
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depending if the real-time structural shortage indicator (SSI) is positive. The SSI is considered positive
if in consecutive quarters the system imbalance (SI) cannot be covered by the incremental bids (IBIDs)
(bottom right of Figure 4). The incremental bids include the increase of the output by a generating unit on
behalf of the system operator in real-time up to its maximum output. Otherwise, if the SSI is not positive,
the imbalance price is the price that would have occurred without the delivery from the strategic reserve
(bottom left of Figure 4).
4 MARKET OUTCOME
After the legal decision on the implementation of a strategic reserve in 2014, the two consecutive winter
periods 2014/15 and 2015/16 have past. Furthermore, the expected volume for the winter 2016/17 is
known. The following section outlines the market outcome of these first market periods.
4.1 WINTER 2014/15, 2015/16 AND 2015/2016
4.1.1 Contracting and Activation
The targeted capacity volume for the strategic reserve has been changed with each winter period. In
the first winter, the target was at 1 200MW. Towards the winter 2015/16 the volume was increased to
3 500MW. For the upcoming winter 2016/17, the targeted volume has been reduced to zero (Figure 5).
The strong increase in the winter 2015/16 was motivated by the absence of nuclear units due to the
nuclear phase-out and the announced closure of more gas-fired units. For the winter periods 2014/15 and
2015/16, the total offered capacity was not sufficient to cover the targeted volume up to the full demand.
The contracted capacity in 2014/15 was only 850MW of the targeted 1 200MW. The offered capacity in
the second winter period has only been 805MWwhile the additionally required capacity was 2 750MW.
For the upcoming winter, the targeted capacity is already fulfilled by the contracts of the first winter
contracted with contract duration of 3 years (see Figure 5). Next to the absolute volume, there have been
additional targets on the shares from SGR and SDR. In 2014/15, the minimum share of SDR has been set
to 50MW. In 2015/16, the additionally contracted volume from SGR was limited in the range of 300 to
500MW, implying that the remaining capacity originating from SDR. The actually contracted volumes in
2014/15 consisted of 750MWSGR and 96MWSDR.While SDRwas contracted for 12months, the SGR
of the period 2014/15 have been contracted for 3 years until the winter 2016/17 (see Figure 5). In 2015/16,
the persistent SGR of the winter 2014/15 could be extended with 427.1MW SGR and 358.4MW SDR,
both, on basis of yearly contracts. No additional contracting for the winter 2016/17 is necessary on top of
the SGR contracted in 2014/15. Especially, the fluctuation of the share coming from SDR is noticeable.
It increased from 96MW in the first winter to 358.4MW in the second winter. There is no contracting
planned for the winter 2016/17. Except for test activations initiated by the market participants and/or the
system operator, so far, there has been no activation of the strategic reserve either based on an economic
or a technical trigger in the winter periods 2014/15 and 2015/16. The test activations have solemnly the
purpose to verify the availability and reaction time of the contracted capacity and their limited influence
the market impact during activation is corrected as good as possible by the system operator.
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Figure 5: Development of sizing and contracting volumes
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During the process of contracting of the winter 2014/15, one offer was considered unreasonable.
Following the advice of the regulator CREG, the submitted volume and proposed price in the offer was
adapted by Royal Decree before the contracting [15].
4.1.2 Cost and Inclusion in Network Tariffs
As the accepted bids including the prices for reservation and activation are not made public, only the
costs brought to account by Elia give insights on the costs for the strategic reserve. The system operator
is obliged to submit the costs and proposed tariff for refunding to the regulator. In turn, the regulator
approves the proposed costs and tariff structure [16]. The communicated costs for the first winter period
2014/15 and the months November and December of 2015 sum up to 42.79Me. The costs include
the cost for reservation of 36.86Me (on average 43.4 ke/MW and year) and the transaction cost of
5.938Me for Elia. Additional costs for the activation are not reported.
In order to refund the costs, Elia is permitted to charge an additional network tariff covering public
service obligations of 0.611e/MWh for all consumers. The tariff became effective by the 1st of February
2015. Assuming an annual electricity consumption of approximately 80 TWh in Belgium, the tariff sums
up to 48.88Me. As of January 2016, the tariff is increased to 0.972e/MWh.
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC RESERVE
The first winter periods and the implementation of the strategic reserve have shown that the strategic
reserve has fulfilled its initial purpose, namely ensuring the generation adequacy despite the announced
closures and the temporarily unavailability of the nuclear power plants. For this purpose the strategic
reserve has been implemented being a basic and effective short-term solution to keep generating units,
which announced to close, available outside of the market. At least 750MW from generating units have
been kept available and new sources of demand response on transmission and distribution level have
been exploited. Notwithstanding that the targeted capacity has not been fully contracted for both winter
periods 2014/15 and 2015/16.
One challenge of the strategic reserve is the determination of the volume more than 12 months in
advance. Given the long span between assessment and delivery, the assessment of the security of supply
can only give recommendations for different scenarios. Based on the scenarios, one volume has to be
selected. For the winter period 2015/16, the initial forecast required a volume of 3 500MW. Closer to
the winter period, the actual required volume has been reduced due to for example the development of
flexibility of demand leading to an estimated reduction of the peak demand with 600MW.
With the lifetime extension for the nuclear power plants by 10 years, the necessity of the strategic re-
serve can be discussed, at least for the purpose of ensuring the upward adequacy in comingwinter months.
After the decision on the lifetime extension, several concerns on the profitability of other conventional
power plants have been raised. There is a threat of the strategic reserve to become a subsidy scheme for
existing gas-fired power plants creating a slippery slope. In the long term, the strategic reserve does not
facilitate the construction of new capacity. This capacity is however needed to deal with adequacy before
and after the phase out of the nuclear units, and provide the required flexibility to deal with RES.
Over the periods of the 3 years, the Belgian strategic reserve has been developed into a mature product
that allows the participation of generating units and demand response within the Belgian control zone.
Especially for demand response, the product has helped the demand side management sector developing
to an advanced state. Nevertheless, additional effort is necessary to standardize the product with respect
to benchmarking and verification of demand response, metering of demand response on transmission and
distribution level, and the transfer of energy during activation.
The current implementation of the strategic reserve achieved the initial goals. However, it is to be
seen how the strategic reserve or, more general, a capacity mechanism accompanying the Belgian energy-
based market will evolve in the upcoming years. With respect to the Guidelines on State aid by the
European Commission [17], a design also needs to be market-wide and technology neutral as well as
needs to address cross-border participation. This has not been part of the Belgian design so far. Changing
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purposes, changing needs of flexibility and compliance with the Guidelines on State Aid are likely to
require a redesign of the Belgian capacity mechanism in the long term.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In order to avoid scarcity, and ensure security of supply during winter months, the Belgian authority has
decided to introduce a strategic reserve. The strategic reserve is a form of capacity mechanism which
aims to overcome threats to the generation adequacy, in particular to cover the demand peaks during the
winter. It gives additional incentives for gas-fired power plants, announced to be closed during reviewed
winter periods, in order to remain available for system stress situation. In addition, demand response on
transmission and distribution level is exploited to react on insufficient supply.
The Belgian mechanism follows the general concept of a strategic reserve. Emergency capacity is
contracted by the system operator, operated by the capacity owner, but activated by the system operator
upon predefined triggers indicating system stress situations. This mechanism explicitly targets generation
capacity which is out-of-the-market, i.e. it does not participate in energy or ancillary service markets.
An economic trigger is linked to insufficient supply on the day-ahead market. The technical is linked to
a risk of structural shortage identified by the system operator by means of assessing expected production
schedules, demand and reserve margins. The product design, the procurement process, and functioning
rules are well documented, and published by the system operator, following the yearly tendering process.
The market outcome of the first two winter periods 2014/15 and 2015/16 reveals that the targeted
volume could never be contracted to its full extent due to absent offers. Yet, during the winter months, an
activation of the strategic reserve has not been necessary because neither the economic nor the technical
trigger have been triggered. In fact, the threat of a partial brown-out and the related debate on generation
adequacy put large attention to the topic of adequacy. The strategic reserve ensured the availability of
gas-fired power plants and new demand response sources have been exploited. In total, the contracted
volume of the strategic reserve has increased from 850MW to 1 535MW. Hereby, the volume of demand
response could be increased from 96MW in the first winter to 427.1MW in the winter 2015/16. However,
the targeted volume fell to zero in 2016/17, and the contracted volume is reduced to 750 MW (three year
contract in 2014/15) due to the prolongation of the nuclear fleet.
The cost of for the first winter period 2014/15 plus November and December 2015 is communicated
as 42.79Me. The costs include the cost for the contracting and the transaction cost of the system operator.
These costs have been transferred into an additional network tariff of 0.611 e/MWh applicable for all
consumers. The tariff became effective February 2015, and is increased to 0.972e/MWh as from 2016.
The Belgian strategic reserve proofed to be an effective short-term solution for the upward adequacy
problem in Belgium. Both, already built capacity have been kept available and new sources of demand
response have been exploited. However, a rethinking of a Belgian capacity mechanism is likely to be
required. Firstly, strategic reserves do not facilitate investments in new capacity, which is a shortcoming
in the context of adequacy and need for flexibility. Secondly, future capacity mechanisms are likely to
align in a European policy framework based on cross-border participation and technology neutrality.
APPENDIX: Product information on Belgian Strategic Reserve
This paper provides a summary of all implemented functioning rules and product definitions established
during the implementation process. For more information and details on technical specifications, the
reader is referred to the published and continuously updated documentation by the system operator:
• Elia: Product Sheet Strategic Reserve (English) [14]
• Elia: Procedure for the Constitution of Strategic Reserve (English) (2015/16) [10]
• Elia: Functioning Rules of the Strategic Reserve (Dutch/French) (2015/16) [11]
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